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1 
CSR AND THE LEGITIMACY OF BUSINESS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
Abstract: 
In this paper we attempt to investigate the attitudes towards their perceived social 
responsibility on the part of the executives of a sample of medium and large Russian 
companies. Our empirical study is based on an original survey of executive managers of 
500 industrial enterprises in almost all regions of Russia. We designed our questionnaire 
using as a starting point some important conclusions made by theorists who analysed the 
development of CSR in mature capitalist economies. Our objective was to probe whether 
the reaction by Russian managers would be in line with expectations grounded in western 
theoretical constructs, in particular the concept of business legitimacy. To preview our 
findings, we got evidence of a discrepancy between anticipated and actual attitudes. This 
result led us to consider a range of economic, social and political factors in the search for 
an explanation. 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, legitimacy, social trust, Russia.
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2 
CSR AND THE LEGITIMACY OF BUSINESS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
All systems of property need legitimation if they are not to 
be seen as the exercise of power and greed. 
(Moran, 2001: 277) 
1. Introduction
Over the past years corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a major conceptual 
and practical issue in the West. Russia, the largest post-communist economy in the world, 
has not stayed immune to this trend either. In 2003 alone no less than six major 
international conferences on CSR took place in Moscow, tending practical advice to the 
target audience of firm managers and government officials. In the same year President 
Putin called on corporations to increase their effort in the field of CSR at the annual 
meeting of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the call that has been 
repeated by him many times since. Some large Russian companies, in particular those 
seeking an international status, were quick to respond and announced various steps in the 
direction of greater transparency, community support, environmental reporting, etc. These 
are the so-called “blue chip” firms, a rather small group of super large firms operating in 
oil extraction and other lucrative industries. Highly visible, they attract considerable 
attention, but they are not representative of the majority of firms in the Russian economy. 
Most firms in Russia are medium to large enterprises, employing between 300 and 5,000 
workers.1 They enjoy no exclusivity, but remain the backbone of the national economy. 
Yet preciously little is known about their stance in regards to CRS. 
1 In 2000 establishments with less than 50 workers employed 1.4% of all labour force in Russia,  51-100 - 
2.7%, 101-200 - 7.1%, 201-500 - 16.2%, 501-1000 - 15.2%, establishments with more than 1000 workers - 
57.3% (Obzor zanyatosti v Rossii. Vypusk 1 (1991-2000). Moscow: Bureau of Economic Analys is. 2002:64). 
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In this paper we attempt to fill in this gap and investigate the attitudes towards their 
perceived social responsibility on the part of the executives of a sample of medium and 
large Russian companies. Our empirical study is based on an original survey of executive 
managers of 500 industrial enterprises in almost all regions of Russia. In terms of size, 
sector affiliation and methods of privatization this sample, compiled on our behalf by the 
Russian Economic Barometer, an independent research centre located in Moscow, is 
reasonably representative of the whole population of Russian medium to large-size 
industrial firms.2 We received 129 replies, securing a respectable response rate of 26% for 
this type of survey. 
Our analysis has a strong comparative element that is reflected in the organisation of this 
paper. We designed our questionnaire using as a starting point some important conclusions 
made by theorists who analysed the development of CSR in mature capitalist economies 
(section 2). Our objective was to probe whether the responses of Russian managers would 
be in line with expectations grounded in western theoretical constructs, in particular the 
concept of business legitimacy. To preview our findings, we found evidence of a 
discrepancy between anticipated and actual attitudes (section 3). This result led us to 
consider a range of economic, social and political factors in the search for an explanation 
(section 4). The last section summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions. 
2. Conceptual background
CSR is addressed by many disciplines, but even within the management literature there are 
numerous definitions of and a variety of perspectives on CSR (for literature overview see 
Vogel, 2005; Lockett, Moon & Visser, 2006; McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006). Under 
2 More details on the sample population used by REB can be found on the official web-page of the Institute 
of World Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences on http://www.imemo.ru/ru/period/barom/. 
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these circumstances the necessary point of departure for any CSR related analysis is to 
establish its conceptual parameters. In defining CSR for the purpose of this study we 
follow a tradition in the literature (McGuire, 1963; Davis, 1973; Carroll, 1979; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) that identifies CSR as situations in which the firm 
intentionally goes beyond compliance with the requirements of the law for the benefit of 
some social or environmental good. As Waldman and colleagues put it, “CSR [is] actions 
that go beyond the immediate legal requirements of the firm” (Waldman, de Luque, 
Washburn & House, 2006: 824). As it might be anticipated, this definition has its 
advantages and disadvantages. First, it focuses attention on what we believe is an essential 
quality that distinguishes the pursuit of CSR activity from other business functions: rather 
than describing the social performance of corporations it provides meaningful criteria for 
delineating CSR actions - they should be voluntary and they should go beyond statutory 
norms. On the other hand, it is far from being exhaustive and often leaves the exact 
position of the dividing line between a CSR and non-CSR activity open for interpretation. 
One reason is the impact of globalisation and the related issue of the extent to which the 
proposed definition allows for possible double standards. There are still parts of the world, 
some transition and developing countries in particular, in which the rule of law is weak and 
even basic public regulations are poorly developed. As a result a case can be made that 
even when a transnational corporation, operating in such an environment, exceeds the 
requirements of the law, this may still not be enough to constitute the act of CSR because it 
falls within the realm of minimal expected norms of behaviour in most countries in which 
this corporation has business interests. This raises a point relevant to the issues we consider 
in this paper: should it be expected that local and international firms are to demonstrate 
similarities in their attitude to the CSR agenda? A different but also relevant set of 
conceptual complications emerges from the well documented fact that many legal norms 
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are ambiguous, which may result in a discrepancy between the letter and the spirit of the 
law. Indeed, from a formal point of view, acting in accordance with the letter of the 
relevant regulations is outside the domain of CSR, but what about obeying the spirit of the 
law? It may well be the case that in order to comply with the latter the firm may need to be 
seen to go beyond statutory requirements, but whether this would represent the act of CSR 
may be open to discussion. Finally, yet another challenge to this definition evolves from 
the growing practice in many developed countries to introduce “voluntary” good practice 
guidelines for companies seeking to meet minimum local expectations for CSR, which, in 
fact, progressively eliminate the “free will” component of CSR actions and turn them into 
a normative requirement.3 
 
Normally we would not expect the definition of a category to explain why this category 
exists. The chosen working definition of CSR, however, provides a good pointer as to 
where the motivation for CSR comes from. It implies that the corporation has not only 
economic and legal obligations formalized in laws, regulations, statutes, etc, but also 
certain responsibilities to the society that extend beyond these normative obligations. In 
other words, CSR suggests the existence of an implicit social contract in which business is 
accountable to society’s expectations or demands. Responding to this notion many authors 
have adopted legitimacy theory as a conceptual master-key to the CSR phenomenon 
(Gutherie and Parker, 1989; Mitchell, 1989; Warren, 1999; Woodward, Edwards and 
Birkin, 2001; Deegan, Rankin and Tobin, 2002; Warren, 2004; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2006; McWilliams, Siegel and Wright, 2006). In line 
with Slim (2002), for our purposes legitimacy might be specified as a particular status with 
which an organisation is imbued and perceived at any given time that enables it to function 
                                                 
3 For example, in May 2001 France mandated that companies quoted on the French stock exchange would 
have to present an annual report on their social and environmental performance (Fombrun, 2005). 
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with the general consent of people and their groups, formal and informal organisations and 
governments that constitute the social environment in which it operates. In a similar vein, 
legitimacy may be also described as a generalised perception that the actions of the firm 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, believes and definitions (Suchman, 1995). In this context CSR presents itself as an 
act of legitimisation. 
 
The conception of legitimacy comes from political science, but it must be noted that some 
of the popular explanations of CSR that seem to be coming strictly from a business and 
economic perspective are in essence not too different from the legitimacy approach or 
incorporate some of its elements. Thus, the stakeholder theory of CSR links the success of 
companies with their ability to maintain trustful and mutually respectful relations with such 
constituents as customers, suppliers, employees, the general public and the government. 
Inevitably, relations with some of them are regulated by informal, morally defined norms 
rather than proper contracts. In other words, the stakeholder theory responds to the 
interrelationship between business and society, which is indeed very close to the key 
assumptions of the legitimacy theory. Similarly, there is an apparent link between the latter 
and another popular approach to CSR, the resource-based-view-of-the-firm (RBV). This 
view presumes that firms are bundles of heterogeneous resources and capabilities that are 
imperfectly mobile across firms and as such may constitute a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Hart (1995) and later McWilliams and Siegel (2001) applied this 
concept to CSR, considering a situation in which a company gets an advantage over 
competition by adding to its product some ‘social’ attribute or feature, which is valued by 
consumers/stakeholders. These attributes, it is argued, may be intangible but are 
consequential nonetheless because they manifest deliberate adherence to socially accepted 
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and expected behaviours. The interpretation of resource as an ability to meet certain 
societal expectations contains an obvious cross-reference between the RBV theory of CSR 
and legitimacy. All in all, the concept of legitimacy probably succeeds the most in 
revealing the feature that is common, in our opinion, to all interpretations of CSR: the 
acknowledgement that in return for the ability to function business is subjected to social 
expectations and constraints that urge it to go beyond statutory norms. 
 
Legitimacy is rooted in public presumption, making it an elusive quality, but this does not 
mean that firms cannot take steps that generate legitimacy. More and more firms see 
strategic value in developing and projecting a caring image that is critical to building up an 
organisation’s reputation (Burke and Logson, 1996; Key and Popkin, 1998; McWilliams, 
Siegel and Wright, 2006). This is normally accomplished by reorienting CSR from a 
sporadic activity of an altruistic nature, like philanthropy, to a strategic function tied to 
more general organisational goals such as increasing profit or strengthening intangible 
assets (reputation, brand, etc). Legitimacy theory assumes that firms will make a rational 
and pragmatic strategic response to the public expectations in order to maintain some sort 
of social compact with society. Such a response is motivated by the realisation that 
compliance with societal expectations is necessary to safeguard some space for the 
freedom of action of business in the pursuit of profit. This implies that although it is not 
impossible for firms to engage in CSR on largely moral or ethical grounds, normally they 
do so to enhance corporate profit or shareholder gain. As Mitchell famously wrote, 
“corporate social responsibility remains businessmen’s preferred response to threats to 
corporate power” (Mitchell, 1989:144). This “enlightened self-interest” thesis has been 
further developed by Jones (1995), Mahoney (1997) and Lawrence, Weber and Post 
(2005). According to Heal (2004), the contribution of CSR to economic performance is 
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that it helps the market to align corporate profits and social costs. This contribution may 
come about in a number of ways, two of which, we believe, are especially relevant to the 
situation in post-communist countries. These are the projection of the positive image of 
corporations and, in particular, removing a strain in relations between corporations and 
their stakeholders that, in Russia, is rooted in mass privatisation of mid-1990s. 
 
According to the literature, even in countries with a long and uninterrupted tradition of 
democracy the privatization of once public assets creates unique legitimisation 
requirements because it is usually accompanied with the provision of some concessions 
and privileges to the new owners at a cost to the public that require justification (Moran, 
2001). In Russia privatisation turned out to be a particularly messy and murky affair that 
traumatised many Russians psychologically and hurt them financially, and still is widely 
regarded as deeply unfair. Public opinion polls indicate that more than a decade after the 
reforms started in Russia the societal acceptance of the market system is still an issue, one 
of the reasons being that corporations have failed to acquire the necessary status of 
legitimacy and respectability with major sections of society (see Pipes 2004 for the 
overview of the Russian public opinion). As a result the image of numerous corporations in 
Russia is tainted with the stigma of fraud, corruption and other forms of antisocial 
behaviour. As late as August 2006 a poll revealed that 44% of Russians thought that the 
activities of big business were detrimental to the interests of the country, 76% were in 
favour of a revision, full or partial, of the results of privatisation and 58% supported an 
increase in the economic role of the state (Levada-Centre, 2006). Consequently there is an 
achingly unresolved matter of businesses facing the challenge of achieving acceptance 
from the wider society and needing to find ways to improve their legitimacy, particularly 
in those cases where the wealth was not created but merely transferred to others. 
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Mutual suspicion in Russia between the people, business and the state is ripe. The people 
see the so-called oligarchs as usurpers of public wealth and politicians as their 
accomplices. In turn, politicians are weary of oligarchs’ political aspirations while the later 
fear state interventionism. When the government tries to fight economic crime this causes 
suspicion that they are picking on political opponents; when big business starts to spend a 
lot of money on charity politicians suspect that oligarchs seek to create an alternative 
political powerbase. Lack of mutual trust is an issue that jeopardises the prospect of 
national economic recovery at present in Russia. A leading Russian economist claims that 
the restoration of trust is the principal issue facing the country (Shastitko, 2003).The 
Russian Economic Development Minister has commented that “The gradual slowdown of 
the economic growth pace we are witnessing now is due to the slowdown of reforms and 
low level of trust between business and authorities” (Johnson’s Russia List 9039, 
28/01/05). 
 
It is not difficult to see, therefore, why, following the logic of the legitimacy concept, 
Russian firms may be expected to find engagement in CSR rewarding. First, they have to 
overcome the unfavourable image they have in the eyes of public opinion caused by messy 
privatisations, confusing and inconsistent economic policies, the dismantling of the 
traditional system of social services, the contraction of the economy, mass 
impoverishment, and a misinterpretation of capitalist values. Second, they are facing the 
challenge of demarcating their territory in relations with the state. Many experts argue that 
for historical, geographical, cultural and political reasons the Russian economy is 
particularly prone to state control (Hellman, 1998; Robinson, 2000; Lynch, 2002). As a 
countermeasure, some commentators predict that corporations which self-regulate may 
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avoid government interference in certain areas and so win favourable regulatory treatment 
compared to others, as the state can be expected to interpret socially responsible behaviour 
as a sign of competence on the part of corporations (Gabarro, 1978; Mitchell, 1989). 
                                             
This analysis of the concepts of corporate legitimacy and CSR, a synopsis of which is 
outlined in this section, provided us with propositions that we can test out against the data 
from our questionnaire. We wanted to find out whether Russian managers of large firms 
were as interested in CSR as their western counterparts; whether their understanding of the 
substance of CSR was similar to that predominant in the west; whether, in the conditions of 
low generalised trust or weak social capital, Russian firms would prioritise CSR as a 
means of increasing their legitimacy with stakeholders; and finally, whether interest in 
CSR by Russian corporations was motivated by a desire to achieve greater freedom from 
state intervention. 
 
3. The Study and Findings 
 
A cross-sectional, non-experimental descriptive survey research design was used to collect 
data from the sample. Following Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield (1985), Angelidis and 
Ibrahim (2004) the survey instrument adopts a forced choice format as especially 
functional in the corporate social responsibility research area because of its ability to limit 
a respondent’s social desirability bias. The instrument was designed to collect information 
on managers’ attitudes to CSR and the factors that determine this attitude. It consisted of 
18 survey questions, including two requesting answers on five point Likert agreement 
scales (e.g., 1 to 5 = very unimportant to very important; strongly agree to strongly 
disagree), and three questions requesting information on the size and the legal form of the 
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firm. To maintain anonymity of the respondents, they were not required to provide their 
name or their company’s name. 
 
The frequency analysis of responses reveals the following picture.  
a. A considerable number of respondents do not regard CSR as topical in modern Russia. 
As many as 39.53 % of respondents answered negatively to the question “Do you agree 
that the idea of CSR is consistent with the current social-economic conditions in Russia?” 
 
b. CSR for many firms is a slogan rather that a strategy: 66% of respondents supported the 
following statement: “In most cases declarations by firms that they adhere to the principles 
of corporate social responsibility are in fact purely public relation exercises,” whilst only 
15.65% disagreed. 
  
c. Managers tend to include in CSR activities (like paying taxes, creating employment, 
abiding by the law) that should not be there according to the recognised definition of CSR 
as “activity that goes beyond standard legal requirements and contracts.” In Table 1 the 
views of respondents are ranged according to the frequency of opinions expressed.   
 
d. Respondents do not believe that active involvement in CSR will result in more freedom 
from state intervention: only 6.20% of respondents think that socially responsible corporate 
performance will reduce regulatory oversight. However, 37.07% believe that it will 
contribute to better relations with central authorities and 62.93% - to relations with local 
authorities.   
 
 12 
e. Almost 50% of managers believe that their firm acts socially responsible but give very 
low marks to everybody else, in particular to the oligarchs. 
 
f. CSR performance is not seen as an important influence determining the public image of 
the firm; financial results are (see Table 2). 
 
g. Lack of financial resources is indicated as a major constraint. Firms also blame the state 
and the legal system for not providing enough incentives (20% and 24% of respondents 
respectively). Interestingly, 14.5% of respondents reported “not enough interest on the part 
of stakeholders” as a hindrance to greater CSR. 
 
4. Discussion  
Summarising the responses, two results stand out with particular prominence. First, firms 
appear to embrace the policies of CSR as a means of legitimisation much less willingly 
than might be expected on the basis of accepted theory and in the context of a Russian 
business legitimacy crisis. Second, the interpretation of CSR by Russian managers differs 
in many respects from the Western rhetoric and conceptions of CSR. It may be asserted 
that the reasons for these features are likely to be overlapping and caused by the specific 
institutional context of the transitional period in the socio-economic development of the 
country. 
 
The notion of CSR has emerged in developed capitalist countries, in which the rule of law 
and other formal and informal institutions, i.e., universal and explicit rules that allocate 
responsibility and set up behavioural boundaries (North, 1990), are firmly in place and 
provide the procedures and routines that allow for the resolution of economic conflict and 
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thus offer a solid and cost-effective foundation for market transactions. In a modern society 
formal institutions operate in an impartial manner, providing for a transparent, stable and 
predictable economic setting (Rose, 1998). Under these circumstances a business has to 
operate according to accepted norms and this is not regarded as something worthy of 
special praise. Consequently, activities aimed at increasing legitimacy require proof of an 
extra effort on the part of the firm that goes beyond statutory requirements and 
demonstrates its recognition of and commitment to certain social expectations. From this 
point of view, for example, the popular choices of CSR activity by our respondents, such 
as paying taxes and abiding by the law, look distinctly out of line. They, however, fit well 
into the picture drawn in the literature that presents Russia as the country with a weak 
institutional environment, in which laws are abused, rules are either feeble or not enforced, 
and institutions are incomplete, tendentious and corrupt (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; 
Black, Kraakman & Tarasova, 1999; Buck, 2003; Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2003). In 
this context CSR is likely to acquire new dimensions compared to a standard Western 
interpretation. 
 
The situation with regard to taxation in Russia bears all the signs of institutional deficiency 
and provides a good example of circumstances that require a modification of the accepted 
view of CSR. During the communist era the taxpayers as well as tax authorities had no 
experience of modern taxation. Most taxpayers were unaccustomed to the notion of a tax 
burden when the old system was replaced by a new one based on western models. If we 
add into the equation a growing mistrust towards the government and its bureaucracy, it is 
not surprising that tax evasion emerged as an essential modus operandi when economic 
actors were confronted for the first time with explicit tax requirements (Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab, 2000). The situation was exacerbated by administrative incompetence: “tax 
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liabilities have often been negotiated rather than determined by law. To make matters 
worse, tax authorities were allowed to impose highly punitive penalties which often bear 
no relationship to the actual tax liability…” (Pogorletskiy and Sollner, 2002:157). 
Businessmen were outraged by high tax rates and the cost of complying with all the 
regulations, which they believed were lethal for their businesses, and found it necessary to 
move their operation into the parallel or “shadow” economy. According to the Expert 
Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Yegiazorova, 1997), in 
the late 1990s up to 75% of firms practiced concealment of a considerable proportion 
of income, the placement of capital abroad, and the evasion of excise duty and smuggling 
as the most common forms of “shadow” activity. Another report claimed that eight firms 
out of ten considered tax evasion and fraud a viable business tactic (Dushatski, 1998). The 
state responded by introducing in 2001, 2002 and 2004 a three stage reform making taxes 
more acceptable and “user-friendly” for taxpayers and creating an environment in which 
paying taxes would make more economic sense to taxpayers than meeting the cost of 
avoiding them. According to some estimates, about 30 billion roubles (US$1billion) of 
income were expected to be legalised (ITAR-TASS, 11.06.2004). Disappointingly, the 
reform has failed to achieve all its objectives. Thus, in 2003 just 0.002% of the labour 
force declared the annual income of over 600,000 roubles (about $1,800 per month) whilst 
experts estimated the number of employees that earned over $2,000 per month at least at 
5% of the labour force. As late as 2004, opinion polls revealed that about a third of 
respondents believed that evading taxes was appropriate whilst more than a half of 
respondents did not condemn tax dodgers or were indifferent to them (Interfax, 
01.11.2004). The social sphere that relies particularly heavily on budget funds feels the 
whole brunt of poor tax collection. In fact the share of social payments in the GDP has 
been falling progressively ever since 2001.  
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This example demonstrates that in economies with a weak institutional environment, 
unlike modern western economies, for many firms just abiding by the law may well 
become a manifestation of CSR in a context where non-compliance is a norm and statutory 
requirements are often little more then a pretence as the authorities and institutions are 
unable to credibly enforce them. In this situation, we believe, emphasis on the condition 
that the firm should go beyond the immediate legal requirements as a criterion of CSR 
calls for modification. The more appropriate formulation should refer to enforceable laws. 
The other two parameters, deliberateness and contribution to some social good, maintain 
their validity. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the survey failed to support our hypothesis regarding the perceived 
relationship between CSR activity and the legitimisation of business. On the one hand, 
52% of the respondents demonstrated awareness of the fact that the society had certain (yet 
unfulfilled) expectations vis-à-vis their firms. On the other hand, they put little value on 
CSR as both a means to increase the prestige of the firm in the eyes of the public and as an 
opportunity to earn some freedom of action from the state. Chart 1 illustrates the responses 
to the question, in which managers were asked to evaluate the impact of a range of factors 
on the public perception of the firm (1-minimal impact; 5-maximum impact). Financial 
results were most widely rated as having the highest impact with the mean of 4.26. All 
three characteristics related to CSR received only moderate ranking with environmental 
practices achieving the mean of 3.25, philanthropy and charitable activities – 3.26, and 
“showing responsibility to society at large” – the mean of 3.16. What attracts attention is 
the configuration of the spread of opinions regarding this last parameter, which is very flat. 
This is most likely to happen either when respondents are unsure about the meaning of the 
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question or there is no prevailing view on the issue, or both. In any case, this pattern of 
distribution may be interpreted as a sign that the managers participating in our survey in 
general did not see the development of a policy on CSR as a priority.  
 
Respondents demonstrated a remarkable unanimity in rejecting the proposition that greater 
involvement in CSR would produce more freedom from state interference. This supports 
the thesis expressed in the literature that although many businesses have now been 
separated from the state, this separation is new and at a tentative stage in the transition 
process in many respects (Ledeneva, 2006). Although many assets and businesses were 
privatised in the 1990s, the signs are that government interference in strategic assets and 
large corporations is increasing once again. One of the reasons is that the state faces the 
challenge of legitimacy itself as a backlash against the role it played in assisting the 
business oligarchs to enormously enrich themselves in the privatization programme and 
obtain huge influence. The Putin government has sought to re-build its authority over these 
strategic corporations to reassure the public that they will make these businesses more 
mindful of public welfare and for strategic policy reasons in Russia’s international 
relations. One consequence is the attempt by the state to take the initiative of promoting 
CSR on its own terms, emphasising the responsibility of firms over social issues which are 
traditionally covered by the state. The efforts of the state are focused on large strategic 
corporations, which are called upon to put in place CSR policies and become more 
transparent and accountable to the public and international investors and thus contribute to 
improving the legitimacy of both the state and these strategic corporations. In this respect, 
the adoption of Western rhetoric and conceptions of CSR is an important part of this 
political strategy and is an example of institutional isomorphism. However, the situation 
confronting the majority of Russia’s business community is very different and our study of 
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large and medium sized businesses indicates that Western CSR notions have little purchase 
or relevance for the managers of these firms because they are unlikely to be used as 
strategic tools of the state’s political and international policies. The managers of these 
firms are convinced that, as follows from our survey, the state is not likely to trade 
intrusive control for greater business self-regulation in the foreseeable future. 
 
One probable explanation of the evidence that Russian managers appear to attach less 
importance to some elements of CSR that are traditionally high on the agenda of western 
corporations is that the legitimacy issue in the Russian context has a different focus. 
Opinion polls still demonstrate that the Russian public tends to deny that business people 
possess such virtues as morality, integrity, talent or hard work. Instead, many Russians 
regard dishonesty and connections as the keys for business success in their country 
(Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2005). In turn, it is not uncommon for members of the 
business community to maintain that the current economic and institutional set-up in the 
country precludes honest ways of making money (Latynina, 1999). In contrast to other 
countries, in Russia there is a considerable degree of ambiguity regarding some most 
fundamental issues including ownership rights, the role of contract, the concept of legality, 
the notion of business ethics, etc, contributing to the unpopular image of the entrepreneur 
and businessman. This suggests that the legitimacy challenge for Russian business outside 
of the largest strategic corporations is very much to establish a consensus where business 
can be seen as an honourable and acceptable activity that will command respect and 
support from the wider society.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The key finding of our study is that there is a notable variance in the position of Russian 
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companies towards CSR. Presenting a positive social image is more likely to be important 
to those of them with high public visibility. There is a handful of super large corporations, 
operating in oil extraction and other lucrative industries, that occupy a strategic position in 
the national economy. They enjoy special relations with the state and seek to attract 
financial resources from foreign and international markets to support their expansion. They 
can be seen participating in social investments and philanthropic actions, inserting CSR 
references in their annual reports and making other efforts to project the image of a 
socially caring business in order to facilitate international recognition and to further their 
contacts with the state. Regarding the nature of the latter one top manager stated: 
“Companies are prepared for any form of social responsibility as long as their property is 
protected” (Denisov and Sitnina, 2005). 
 
By contrast, those large and medium sized firms that do not have the benefit of an 
exclusive relationship with the state are far less committed to CSR. Our survey reveals that 
almost half of respondents believe that the conditions are not yet right for them to take on 
more social responsibility. Lack of financial resources is indicated as a major constraint. 
Firms also blame the state and the legal system for not providing enough incentives (20% 
and 24% of respondents respectively). Characteristically, some managers are concerned 
that greater expenditure by companies on CSR may encourage the state to increase taxes. 
 
Our results are in line with those obtained by earlier studies. The survey “The Social 
Portrait of the Russian Firm” undertaken by the Association of Russian Managers 
(Moscow) in 2003 revealed that firms favoured those CSR actions that related to profit-
maximising activities while environment protection and community projects were not 
marked as priorities (Vestnik assotsiatsyi menedzherov, 2003, October, No.1: 27). Another 
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study by the Association found that only 12% of the 300 top managers surveyed believed 
that CSR activities could result in better relations with the state (Litovchenko and 
Korsakov, 2003: 51).  
 
Theorists maintain that business enhances its legitimacy when it conforms to institutional 
constrains (Palmer and Biggart, 2002). The mixed picture of attitudes held by Russian 
managers towards CSR brought to light by our study reflects, in our opinion, the many 
controversies and ailments of Russian post-communist transition related to the current 
stage in the development of formal and informal institutions in the country. Legitimacy 
theory postulates that to operate successfully companies need to take into account society’s 
concepts of business responsibility and what society perceives to be “appropriate” actions. 
Legitimacy itself, however, is not a fixed set of moral norms. It develops and changes over 
time following alterations in the perception of what is appropriate held by the majority of 
people. This assumes the existence of a mechanism that conveys the attitudes of the society 
to the firm. As Woodward, Edwards and Birkin (2001: 387) indicate, it may be of an 
informal, morally-defined variety as regards some of the stakeholders with which the 
company interacts, compared with the more formal, and contractually-defined relationship 
it has with other stakeholders, particularly the owners. In both cases the presence of 
institutions that allow the gathering of valid information on economic actors, the 
monitoring of their performance and that will penalise opportunistic behaviour is critical. 
Weak institutions create the ambience of permissiveness; economic agents are not 
encouraged to act fairly because self-interested behaviour meets little resistance. Our 
survey suggests that in Russia some forms of communication between society and business 
have more impact on the latter than the other. The pre-eminent position of the state, 
reinforced under President Putin, makes businesses very sensitive to signals coming from 
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this direction. The state has already captured the term CSR but promotes its interpretation 
in a way that emphasises the payment of taxes and the taking of responsibility over social 
issues which are traditionally covered by the state.4 At the same time large and medium 
firms appear to be less responsive towards CSR imperatives that come from the local 
community, NGOs, and social movements, etc. Building on North’s notion that business 
practices that come into existence will reflect the opportunities provided by the 
institutional matrix, it may be assumed that the current “rules of the game,” as institutions 
are sometimes defined, do not support the impact of the community, etc on the firm. 
 
There is one other consequence of the weakness of the institutions that, as we see it, helps 
to explain the finding that Russian firms do not prioritise CSR as a means that increases 
their legitimacy with stakeholders. As was mentioned earlier, theory predicts that on the 
part of the firm interest in CSR may be motivated by the desire to substitute some forms of 
formal regulation by self-regulation and so win favourable regulatory treatment compared 
to others. However, it is sensible for the firm to make an extra effort only if the regulations 
are efficient, universally and fairly enforced and sufficiently stable, i.e., if there is no 
discrepancy between the declared and actual “rules of the game.” If this is not the case, 
whatever the social expectations are, the rational economic actor will be discouraged from 
producing such an effort because formal regulations and relations have little currency. 
Thus, some international companies operating business units in countries with a low 
degree of economic freedom have found themselves in a position when it proved difficult 
to be seen to be doing the “right” things, no matter what they did (Woodward, Edwards & 
Birkin, F., 2001). In the Wall-Street Journal’s 2007 Index of Economic Freedom Russia is 
                                                 
4 According to the data of the Association of Russian Managers many firms are reluctant to make public 
information on CSR because this may provoke ill-favoured attention from a variety of parties, ranging from 
self-interested bureaucrats to criminals. Evidently, presidential blessing for the few is not a sufficient impulse 
for the majority of large and medium firms to acknowledge their involvement in the field of CSR.   
 21 
ranked 39th out of 41 countries in the European region. Its main weaknesses are identified 
as rampant corruption, the insecurity of property rights, arbitrary law enforcement and 
bureaucratic inconsistency. These are not the conditions that are likely to make Russian 
firms receptive to the values of CSR on a voluntary basis.     
 
It may also be argued that the socio-economic situation in Russia creates yet more 
obstacles for local firms if they wish to embrace western notions of CSR because by doing 
so they may sow the seeds of confusion about the purpose of business in Russian society. 
The scepticism of Russian managers towards the state’s call for them to embrace CSR and 
a wider set of social and environmental responsibilities may be a pragmatic response to the 
situation. The business model presently influential in large and medium sized Russia firms 
is one where business wishes to be seen as separate from the state and its wider social 
commitments. This is a view where business is seen as a distinct and limited endeavour 
that has narrow and specific, but, nonetheless, important basic responsibilities. After all, if 
businesses have only relatively recently freed themselves from these wider social 
obligations and activities why would they wish to appear to be re-embracing them again 
and risk giving the misleading impression that business is once again becoming part of the 
state. The model of business legitimacy that will support large businesses, apart from those 
where the State seeks to retain its influence is, in our survey, one much more in tune with 
the views of the neo-liberal market theorists where business responsibilities to society are 
specific and limited. Its claim to legitimacy rests upon sticking to its sphere of operation 
and in delivering the prosperity that society needs. CSR in the Russian context is 
interpreted by Russian managers as much more about creating productive firms that 
provide real jobs and that generate wealth. By showing that business can act independently 
of the state, business people may be hoping to build the social legitimacy of business as an 
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honourable and respectable occupation. If this were to be successful, this could be seen as 
a real achievement in the context of a society where 70 years of communist propaganda 
attempted to portray business as rapacious and immoral enterprise that exploited the 
working class and impoverished the third world. Our results may be interpreted as 
evidence that the business legitimacy challenge in the Russian large firm context is dealt 
with at the moment not so much through re-embracing welfare and social responsibilities 
but through demonstrating that business is a wealth creating function that is of benefit to 
society because it provides employment, incomes, taxes and shareholder wealth. By 
attempting to deliver on these basic, but to date, in the context of Russia, often neglected 
responsibilities, firms are hoping to gain a wider social support and some independence 
and freedom from state interference and lay down a marker separating themselves from the 
old way of doing things. 
On the basis of this analysis it seems unlikely that CSR will spontaneously emerge in 
contemporary Russia as it has in the West. This may change if the state can take the 
initiative and underwrite and guarantee consistent, fair and enforceable rules and laws so 
that firms may follow their own inclination in the direction of CSR without fear. In this 
way the state may start the “virtuous circles,” that inspire trust and the growth of social 
capital. The importance of this reform process cannot be overestimated.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of CSR as perceived by Russian managers 
Rank Characteristic Frequency
1 looking after employees 0.904 
2 protecting the environment 0.760 
3 paying taxes 0.704 
4 being ethical with the stakeholders 0.632 
5 creating jobs 0.608 
6 contributing to charities 0.584 
7 contributing to the welfare of the local 
community 
0.576 
7 obeying laws  0.576 
8 making a profit 0.395 
9 adhering to international standards of ethical 
business conduct 
0.296 
n=125 
Table 2. Characteristics of the firm that have the greatest impact on its public 
image as perceived by Russian managers (1-minimal impact; 5-maximum impact). 
Rank Characteristic Mean n
1 Financial results 4.26 121 
1 The reputation of the firm 4.26 112 
2 The reputation of the brand 4.05 111 
3 Identification and pursuit of 
opportunities 
3.95 109
4 The competence of managers 3.89 115 
5 Business ethics 3.69 110 
6 Labour practices 2.75 116 
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